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Editors’ Foreword
 It has been almost two years since we first decided to embark on a 
project of organizing an international philosophical conference which 
would be devoted to a familiar but highly disturbing subject: the 
extraordinary upsurge of nationalism in its novel and unprecedented 
forms, with extreme xenophobia as one of its central features. The 
conference, organized by the Center for Philosophy of the Institute of 
Social Sciences, under the title “Xenophobia, Identity and New Forms 
of Nationalism”, was held on October 4–5 of 2018 in Belgrade. It was 
attended by 17 lecturers from eight countries, most of them 
philosophers, but also sociologists, political scientists, jurists, journalists 
or fiction writers. This collective volume is its result.
As is well known, at the time of the inception of our idea, the is-
sue of new nationalism and xenophobia had already become burning 
not only in Europe (in the political as well as historical and cultural 
meaning of the term) but in many other parts of the world too. Sadly, 
in the meantime, it has gained even more in impetus and significance in 
social, political and institutional life, above all in developed Western 
countries. Obviously, one of the main reasons for this state of affairs is 
the (so inappropriately named) “migration problem”, which is in fact 
the problem of inequality in the world society. If the words “migration” 
or “immigration” did not figure in the title of the conference, it is only 
because their connection to xenophobia, to the new forms of national-
ism and to the politics of identity is so manifest, that those terms, as it 
seemed to us, could be omitted with no harm for the discussion of our 
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subject, and because we hoped that the imposing realities to which 
they refer would not be overlooked by the participants anyway. This 
has proven to be true. 
However, the sheer topicality of the theme was not the only 
reason for our decision to devote a special attention to it. Dealing with 
what we have termed “new nationalism”, strongly colored by xenopho-
bia and framed in identitarian slogans – most of them newly forged, 
but highly reminiscent of the past – is above all intellectually challeng-
ing, particularly from, dare we say, a philosophical point of view. It in-
volves a distinctly philosophical task of identifying the conceptual bor-
ders of a historically changing, Protean phenomenon. What is at stake 
here is the relationship between old and new forms of nationalism, 
which forms the center of the first part of the volume (“Xenophobia In-
herited, Xenophobia Transformed”). Is new nationalism merely a se-
quel to the historical one, or something radically different and novel? 
No doubt this question allows for different answers. At the very least, 
the new nationalism seems to have taken the place in the political spec-
trum which was up to now occupied by extremist far-right parties, and 
deserves for that reason to be treated as their successor. In particular 
cases, historical continuity is warranted by sticking to the old party 
name, regardless of significant and outspoken changes in the party 
program. However, one may even go so far as to deny altogether that 
the new xenophobic identitarianism represents a form of nationalism 
as we have known it, as is the case in the opening article of the first sec-
tion (by Rastko Močnik). 
Another point calling for reflection is the relationship between 
nationalist and xenophobic practices or feelings and the world of ideas 
or systems of thought in the broadest sense of the term (treated by 
Goran Bašić, János Boros, Slobodan Divjak). This relationship is at least 
twofold, as it can signify either the embeddedness of nationalism in 
ideological and philosophical matrices which serve to justify it, or the 
capacity of the latter to deal with nationalism and its detrimental socie-
tal effects. Here again, the most striking feature of new nationalism is 
perhaps its extraordinary capacity to change and adapt to different 
ideological and philosophical standpoints – postmodernism, communi-
tarianism, multiculturalism or even liberalism. By appropriating the ar-
guments of their opponents – by appealing to justice, equality or right 
to difference – new nationalist narratives blur the distinctions between 
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different theoretical positions and their usual political implications 
(most notably, the one between “progressive” and “reactionary” politi-
cal orientations) and provoke confusions in our ideological maps – or 
testify to their inadequacy for understanding the issues of contempo-
rary world. For example, new nationalism has developed an elaborate 
strategy of victimization of the very hegemonic social groups (as shown 
by Lewis R. Gordon), which works very well, even if it is based on com-
pletely false premises. In contrast to earlier forms of missionary or “civi-
lizing” nationalism or imperialism, characteristic of the historical West-
ern metropoleis, it has also achieved important successes in presenting 
itself under the modest guise of a merely protective nativist move-
ment, having a defensive posture and no other ambitions than to de-
fend its “own” home or territory from aggressive newcomers (as ar-
gued by Aleksandar Prnjat and Vladimir Milisavljević).
The stress laid on xenophobia by the conference title presented 
the risk of suggesting that the new forms of nationalism should be 
viewed solely in terms of a subjective experience, which would result in 
moralizing or even demonizing criticism of it. This type of criticism is all 
too frequent in political and ideological disputes. However, taken by it-
self, it is of a rather limited scope. This danger has been averted by the 
approach adopted by most of the contributors, particularly by those 
who have highlighted economic and political causes which have given 
rise to new nationalism and defined its special character – above all, 
those which pertain to the transformation of capitalism in a globalized 
world economy of our days (Rastko Močnik, Natalija Mićunović, Paget 
Henry). Their contributions suggest that, rather than a wanton senti-
ment, xenophobia should be considered as an essential piece function-
ing in the complex machine of worldwide domination.
Several chapters of the volume – as a rule, but not exclusively, 
they have been grouped in the second section (“Global vs. Local and 
Topical Differences”) – have given special attention to local histories 
and developments of nationalism and xenophobia in Western and East-
ern Europe, the USA, Serbia, the countries of former Yugoslavia and 
the Arab World (by William Leon McBride, Paget Henry, Ugo Vlaisavlje-
vić, Dean Komel, Muharem Bazdulj and Dušan Janjić). Some of them 
have adopted a more specific perspective of gender (Michał Kozłowski) 
or legal studies (Ana Dimishkovska and Igor Milinković), focusing, in par-
ticular, on the questions of discrimination and identitarianism. However 
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diverse, those topical analyses have let come to the fore essential, if 
unfortunate similarities between different states, regions or conti-
nents, epitomized by the growing importance of walls and barbed wire 
fences as a major political symbol of our imperfectly globalized world. 
In such a segregated world – to briefly comment on the title of the 
third and last section – “open questions”, and even disagreements, may 
count much more than attempts at finding final “solutions”. Editing of 
this volume was a pleasure, but it also gave rise to more questions and 
will, hopefully, lead to new adventures in researching intriguing phe-
nomena of nationalism and identity.
At last, we wish to thank all those whose aid gave to this volume 
its present form and made its publication possible. In the first place, we 
are grateful to the reviewers who have thoroughly scrutinized its con-
tents and went through the painstaking job of amending it by their 
valuable suggestions: professor Aleksandar Bošković (Faculty of Philos-
ophy, University of Belgrade), professor Omar Dahbour (Hunter Col-
lege and Graduate School, City University of New York), professor Ar-
naud François (Department of Philosophy, University of Poitiers), 
Suzana Ignjatović, senior research associate (Institute of Social Sci­
ences, Belgrade), professor and corresponding member of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts Alpar Lošonc (Faculty of Technical Sci-
ences, University of Novi Sad) and professor Đorđe Pavićević (Faculty of 
Political Sciences, University of Belgrade). We would like to extend our 
gratitude to professor Vojin Rakić, president of the program commit-
tee of the conference, as well as to other members of the said commit-
tee: professor Arnaud François, professor Jane Gordon, professor 
Lewis R. Gordon, professor Paget Henry, professor Dejan Jović, profes-
sor Michał Kozłowski, professor Martin Matuštík, professor William 
Leon McBride and professor Ugo Vlaisavljević. Our special thanks are 
due Mrs. Svetlana Inđić­Marjanović, general affairs assistant at the Insti-
tute of Social Sciences, who has been of great help in organizing the 
conference, as well as to M.A. Vesna Jovanović, librarian, who has care-
fully supervised the process of publication of this volume, and other 
members of the staff. The conference and publication of the book 
were realized with funding from the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
Vladimir Milisavljević and Natalija Mićunović
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Introductory Remarks 
Nationalism: What Do Intellectuals Think?
 Many warn that the spirit of nationalism once again fuels pas-
sions that not only provoke uncomfortable anxiety, but also cause 
fear, suffering, misfortune, crises and misunderstanding. A sub-
stantial number of people indicate that apart from “bad” destruc-
tive nationalism, “good” nationalism also exists, based on love of 
one’s own nation and country (patriotism), or on national homoge-
nization aimed at liberation from external dominance. It is a com-
mon opinion that a patriot is loyal to a way of life and the customs 
that he/she cherishes and observes in community with like­minded 
people with whom he/she shares common ethnic origin, as well as 
linguistic and cultural heritage. A patriot is defensive in nature (see 
Orwell 1945, 12), he/she perceives nationalism, just like religion, as 
a private matter which is publicly displayed only rarely, usually on 
special, festive occasions, and always with the utmost decorum. 
Conversely, xenophobia implies fear and suspicion of foreigners, 
their values and customs, leading to prejudice and disdain for eth-
nic differences at best, with its radical forms being racism and 
chauvinism. Xenophobia is fear enveloped in hate. In conclusion, 
you can make a rough divide indicating that “good” nationalists 
love their nation per se, not trying to force their patriotic feelings 
onto others in any way, while “bad” nationalists love their nation at 
the expense of other nations, while their love often amounts to ob-
session and monomania. 
In case we accept the existence of good nationalism, we still 
face the problem that, with a grain of populism, the boundaries be-
tween good and bad nationalism are erased at the expense of the 
former. Populism, which became a characteristic of contemporary 
political culture, has contributed, despite global and regional inte-
gration processes, to both homogenization of national programs 
and strengthening of nationalism (Bašić 2017). The influences of 
contemporary nationalisms are evident in social relations, econom-
ic measures on global and regional levels, political action and 
strengthening of people’s movements. Thus revitalized, 
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nationalism has awakened in people national pride and homogeni-
zation, both of which have been believed, following “the end of his-
tory”, to belong to premodernity, while on the other hand it has in-
cited fear and uncertainty. The two faces of Janus are nowhere so 
clearly visible as with the phenomenon of nationalism, and should 
we place on one plate of Iustitia’s scales what “good” nationalism 
has produced in modern history, while placing the legacy of the 
“bad” xenophobic nationalism on the other, it would not be hard to 
guess which of them would prevail. 
Providing that nationalism produces fear and has caused 
dire suffering and catastrophic collapses of the civilization in the 
past, how come that nationalists are so popular and enjoy people’s 
support? Attempting to explain the unexplainable, Mario Vargas 
Llosa indicates that all “left” and “right” nationalist movements in 
South America ended up in dictatorship: “Nationalism is a widely 
spread out ideological perversion, as it influences the instincts that 
are deeply rooted in human beings, such as fear of the different 
and new, fear of and hate against the other, a person who worships 
different gods, speaks a different language and observes different 
customs, and it actually – needless to say – has instincts that are en-
tirely contrary to civilization. Therefore, the nationalism of our 
times is but a reactionary, anti-historical, racist ideology, and an en-
emy of progress, democracy and freedom” (Vargas Llosa 2017; see 
also Vargas Llosa 2018).
It would be unfair, of course, to neglect the strength of na-
tionalism, which created the nation state and nations. Moreover, 
many a statesman, philosopher, or writer has secured his place in 
anthologies and textbooks by believing that nations and the states 
based on them are results of the cosmopolitism founded on frater-
nity, freedom, and equality, with the purpose of securing everlast-
ing peace and liberation of humanity from the pest that is racism, 
chauvinism, and xenophobia. They believed in freedom, democra-
cy, and individualism as creative forces behind liberal state, which 
should have brought forth a humane society, incompatible with pri-
mordial nationalism and populism. John Stuart Mill believed that it 
was essential for the Scotsmen, Irishmen, and Welshmen, as well as 
for the Bretons, Occitans, and Gauls to become integrated into the 
British and French nations. He believed liberal civil nations to be 
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important for political and economic stability, while he saw a 
chance for their strengthening in autochthonous peoples’ renunci-
ation of identity, and their integration into wider national con-
cepts. 
However, during the 20th century only, things spiraled out 
of control on a number of occasions. First, a nation state based on 
the principle of ethnicity destroyed the dynastic principle of legit-
imacy, claiming an enormous number of victims along the way, 
only for National Socialism (Nazism), founded on racism and the 
interests of financial capital, to bring the civilization to the brink 
of extinction. During the “Cold War”, Marxists believed that na-
tion state and nationalism would lose their importance within the 
global perspective of the labor movement, while liberals on their 
part thought that the strength of ethnicity, as the most powerful 
primordial stimulus for nationalism, would ebb away in civil state. 
Despite the belief that nationalism would lose its destructive 
force after “the end of history”, ethnic and religious conflicts and 
secession demands occurred yet again, thus distancing the mod-
ern world even more from the ideas of humanistic and cosmopoli-
tan development. Multiculturalists, who usually perceive the no-
tion of tolerance as the basis for overcoming individual and 
collective prejudice and animosities, have overlooked the fact 
that the humanistic ideas contained in the doctrines of the 
“great” religions such as Christianity and Islam, which had been 
founded on the ideal of people’s unity in faith, peace, and love, in-
deed failed to eliminate local nationalisms, and rather conversely 
ignited the sparks of fervor which resulted in fires that would de-
vour both ideas and people. 
It is commonly known that concentration of one’s attention 
on a phenomenon may produce “blindness” in the researcher when 
it comes to seemingly ephemeral, but actually essential facts. It is 
thus possible that interculturalists, overcome by the vision of de-
velopment based on respect and intertwining of differences, fail to 
see the progressive side of modern nationalism, they perhaps may 
be “unjustifiably” apprehensive of the revitalization of Nazism and 
Anti­Semitism, or their memories of ethnic conflicts are so vivid 
that they do not see the progress in national homogenization and 
ethnic mobilization. Scottish, Kosovar, or Catalan nationalists feel 
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otherwise, they draw from nationalism the strength necessary for 
political and economic independence and liberation from the politi-
cal or any other influence of their composite states. Scottish Prime 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon, the leader of the Scottish National Party, 
advocates separation of Scotland from Great Britain and, in addi-
tion to historical reasons, believes that the political decisions made 
by the British Government concerning leaving the EU have largely 
contributed to the strengthening of Scottish nationalism (Euro-
news 2019). On the other hand, laborite Sadiq Khan, Mayor of Lon-
don of Pakistani origin, equates Scottish nationalism with racism 
(Guardian 2017). It is also interesting to note that more than 40% 
of Pakistani immigrants in Scotland support the country’s secession 
from Great Britain (Bašić 2018, 114). The British policy of multicul-
turalism, developed in the second half of the 20th century, has not 
only obviously failed to pacify traditional nationalisms, but also 
been lenient when it comes to their recent incarnations. National-
ism is like a subterranean river; it always finds a crack to spring out 
of and create itself a new course. 
It cannot be avoided, when talking about nationalism, to 
also discuss the issue of the role and responsibility of intellectuals 
for the consequences of nationalism. In a newspaper article, Žarko 
Puhovski wrote sharply about nationalism: “There is a defective, 
‘perverse’ attitude present in our public that intellectuals are those 
writing beautiful poems, novels, or philosophical treatises. These 
are great writers, philosophers, painters, yet they are not great in-
tellectuals. In his lectures, Sartre says that an intellectual is he/she 
who deals with things that do not concern him/her, i.e., public 
things. I am not an intellectual if I say that my salary is low – this 
makes me a unionist. I am an intellectual when I speak of things 
that do not directly threaten me. If you take my example, in case I 
support Serbs in Croatia, as an ethnic Croat I am an intellectual, 
since I am not threatened as Serbs are”. Worth thinking over when 
it comes to the relationship of intellectuals with nationalism is the 
response by Gajo Petrović to the invitation to participate in the de-
bate by Serbian and Croatian intellectuals entitled “Mind before 
the Avalanche of Political Barbarism”, in which he said that he had 
not established himself as either Serbian or Croatian intellectual, so 
he was not qualified to participate in the debate (see Jakšić 2011, 
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77–78). By refusing any national distinction, Gajo Petrović stood 
against the national constraints that delimit humanity. 
Attitudes like those quoted above are not rare. On the con-
trary, there are numerous examples of critical positions of intellec-
tuals towards nationalism. However, more frequent and publicly 
visible are anti-intellectual opinions, falling within constricted pri-
mordial limits of nation, grounded in the feeling of the ever-pres-
ent danger of others and failure to accept the fact that everything, 
including national identity and the nation based on it, is prone to 
changes. These opinions lack the maturity, fortitude, and talent 
which make intellectual criticism creative, proactive, pressure resis-
tant and, finally, freed from any passion and interest. Dragoljub 
Mićunović, reflecting on the oeuvre and practical humanism of An-
drija Krešić, one of the enlighteners of the Balkan intellectual cas-
bah, writes that Krešić was among the rare educated people en-
dowed with plebeian moral tact (Mićunović 2018) – a trait in one’s 
character that intellectualism may sprout from. For an intellectual, 
in the full meaning of the word, this humanistic substrate is more 
important than education, or encyclopedic accumulation of scien-
tific and other facts. 
An intellectual is a creator, the one who inspires and incites 
others to action and reflection, expands horizons, and when criti-
cizing, he/she does not do so for the sake of glory, or personal in-
terest, but for the common good. When the intellectual speaks of 
nationalism, he/she is mostly alone and risks that the logic, ethics, 
and verisimilitude (facts) that his/her ideas are based on would 
cause the anger of the “orthodox” intellectuals, imbued with the 
romanticism of the “original” nationalism and the deceptive and of-
ten biased memories of the glorious national past and the injus-
tices inflicted on “us” by “others”. Unlike intellectual criticism, that 
of an intellectual freed from intellectualism is ideological one, 
which in its essence has the tendency to represent the interest of 
the ruling group as the general interest and public good. Responsi-
bility for the consequences of such “blindness” and the tension 
brought about by the conflict between authentic ideas and “plagia-
rism” and quasi­interpretations, is placed by Machiavelli on the in-
tellectual: “when the evils that arise have been predicted (which 
only wise men can do), they can be quickly dealt with. But when, 
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though not having been predicted, they have been permitted to 
grow in a way that everyone can see them, there is no longer a 
remedy” (Machiavelli 2006). The intellectual is the one who should, 
for the benefit of everyone else, timely recognize and explain the 
problem, and confront it with truth. However, the intellectual is 
not the world’s conscience and cannot accept responsibility for the 
consequences caused by the nationalist politics and rhetoric. The 
responsibility of an intellectual can only be that of the failure to 
don Socrates’ chiton in a timely manner, or at all, while the political 
and historical responsibility belongs with those who advocated, ag-
itated for, and implemented nationalist policies. 
Criticism of nationalism does not garner praise and rewards, 
but usually provides pseudointellectuals with an opportunity to 
strike back. A good example is the “Declaration on the Common 
Language”, with which a group of thinking men, most of them soci-
olinguists and linguists, has pointed to the schism between linguis-
tic reality and linguistic policy in a part of the post-Yugoslav politi-
cal space, that is, to the well­known truth that Bosnian, 
Montenegrin, Croatian, and Serbian are standard forms of a single, 
polycentric language (Bugarski 2018a and 2018b). Despite the fact 
that the Declaration does not contest political reality and the right 
of nation states to freely chose the name for “their own” language, 
its authors and signees have been unfoundedly criticized and ac-
cused of being national traitors, advocates of the restoration of Yu-
goslavia, which must be the gravest sin for the orthodox national-
ists in the region, and whatnot. The most vocal critics were 
linguistic purists and nationalists who have, for decades, ever since 
the establishment of the nation states, vehemently perpetrated vi-
olence against the languages and identities of the peoples, trying 
to find, and often even construct linguistic differences. 
Asking in the early 1970s whether nationalism was our desti-
ny, academician Ljubomir Tadić clearly predicted the rise of nation-
alist right in Yugoslavia, but he could not foresee that near the end 
of his life he would be “praised” and arrogated by Serbian national-
ists, i.e., the very “practitioners of ketman” who had looked down at 
their feet when faced with his uncompromising fight for justice, 
freedom, and truth. The opinions of his colleagues, mainly former 
members of the Praxis group, that by adopting nationalism Tadić 
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had sunk into his own oeuvre, did less damage to his reputation 
than the odes sung to him by those who had once been building 
their conformist careers in academia based on the very idea of Yu-
goslavhood. 
Contemporary political conditions favor nationalists and the 
right. The lately held elections for the European Parliament have 
indicated the strengthening of the populist right in Italy, France, 
Hungary, Poland, and Great Britain, while the corruption affair of 
the far-right Austrian Freedom Party, revealed immediately before 
the elections, failed to significantly weaken this party’s position, or 
that of the Alternative for Germany, their German allies. Nationalist 
ideology has a traditionally strong foothold in the Balkans. Authori-
tarian political culture and populism suit well the parties of conser-
vative right, whose programs are based on nationalism. Moreover, 
even today’s liberals resort to nationalist rhetoric, so it seems true 
that nationalism is our destiny. In the constitutions of the majority 
of the Balkan states, nation state and nation­based government 
are fundaments of statehood. Exceptions are multinational states 
of North Macedonia and Montenegro, which adopted citizenship as 
their main state-building substrate, yet their daily functioning indi-
cates that their political systems have mechanisms in their core, 
whose main aim is to pacify different, often contradictory ethnic 
(national) interests. National homogenization is also contributed to 
by Eurocentric distrust of migrants, as well as of Islam, believers of 
which make for ideal dangerous others in the context of populist 
nationalism. 
Contributing factors to the flourishing of nationalism also in-
clude the fact that multicultural European states do not nurture poli-
cies of multiculturalism based on trust and cultural interweaving. On 
the contrary, policies have been adopted to protect national, ethnic 
and linguistic minorities, based on mutual tolerance of a myriad of 
monocultural groups. Such policies stimulate and nurture national-
isms which could, as history has taught us, make Janus’ evil face turn 
to “us”, should this prove to be in the interest of political, economic, 
and financial centers of power. The notions that only “good” nation-
alism will prevail and that nationalism would disappear in the histori-
cal perspective are but an illusion. Political, educational, and cultural 
systems, as well as language policies of European states are 
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nationally denoted, and multicultural practices represent just (un)de-
sirable exceptions. Serbia and Croatia make for a striking example as, 
though they have a civilizational responsibility and unquestionable 
national interest to overcome their misunderstandings and the con-
sequences of their prior conflicts, they have nevertheless adopted 
the systems to protect the rights of national minorities, which reflect 
the ethnic distance between their respective majority peoples and 
national minorities, thus nurturing each other’s nationalisms. These 
are the systems of national minorities’ protection better suited for 
early 20th century, when it was believed that the identity of a people 
is best preserved in their elite. 
The superiority of nationalists over multiculturalists should 
not discourage the latter. There may be no reason for excessive op-
timism, but neither for quitting critical thinking of the social rela-
tions and consequences of the policies based and fed on national-
ism. British scientists believe that Brexit is an effect of nationalism 
(among numerous articles, see Salter 2016, and Martill and Staiger 
2018) and that the consequences of the decisions made on the 
wave of populism would prove to be a long-term source of local 
and global crises. Serbian experts see in Brexit, among other 
things, the energy which should lend additional strength to nation 
state (Antonić 2016; Ljušić 2016). The paradigms in the context of 
which we perceive nationalism have a decisive role in the manner in 
which we explain different aspects of this complex social phenom-
enon. Critical, open thought and responsibility for the word spoken 
are the most effective safeguards against the capricious nature of 
nationalism, which, as a rule, serves as a confirmation of the per-
ception of human nature as authoritarian.
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